Effects of Minimal Group Identity on Processing of Evaluative Information by Heindl, Timothy R.
EFFECTS OF MINIMAL GROUP IDENTITY 
ON PROCESSING OF EVALUATIVE INFORMATION 
A Thesis presented to 
The College of Arts and Sciences 
Drake University 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science 
by 
Timothy R. Heindl 
April 1994 
EFFECTS O F  MINIMAL GROUP IDENTITY ON 
PROCESSING OF EVALUA'ITVE: INFORMATION 
by 
Timothy R. Heindl 
Approved by Committee: 
Chairperson 
EFFECTS OF MINIMAL GROUP IDENTITY ON PROCESSING OF 
EVALUATIVE INFORMATION 
An Abstract of a Thesis by 
Timothy Richard Heindl 
April 1994 
Advisor: Dr. Judith Allen 
The Problem. 
The purpose of this study was to assess whether minimal group identity, 
as established through a minimal group paradigm, could influence processing of 
evaluative information. Minimal group identity was measured through a series 
of trait scales on which subjects were asked to rate own group and out group 
members. Processing speed was measured through a semantic priming 
paradigm previously used with stereotyped primes and traits. It was predicted 
subjects would rate own group members higher than outgroup members. 
Additionally it was predicted that subjects' reaction times would be faster to 
positive character traits after their own group label than the outgroup's label. 
Procedure. 
Seventy-two Drake University students (36 female and 36 male) were 
randomlydivided into one of two groups by a dot estimation task and assigned 
a group label (YOF or LAJ). Subjects performed the semantic priming task 
with minimal group labels serving as primes of positive and negative character 
traits. Evaluative trait scales were used as dependent measures of ingroup 
bias. 
F i n h s .  
Analysis of trait scales revealed that the minimal group paradigm, as 
presented in this study, failed to establish ingroup bias as predicted. 
Unexpectedly, subjects consistently rated outgroup members higher than 
ingroup members across all evaluative traits. Results of reaction time 
analyses were contingent upon the establishment of minimal group identity; 
therefore those results can not be interpreted as supporting or refuting the 
main hypothesis of this study. 
ConcEusions. 
Because minimal group identity was not established in this study, it 
should not be concluded that minimal group labels cannot be reference points 
that would facilitate processing of positive and negative information. A test 
of this hypothesis requires clear determination that the minimal group 
paradigm formed group boundaries and established ingroup bias. 
Recommendations. 
In a future replication the minimal group paradigm could again be used 
in conjunction with a semantic priming task, but with an experimental 
population of either all male or all female subjects. Additionally, a mixed 
gender population should be used, but with more interaction between and 
within groups, a competitive element or a self esteem manipulation. It is 
possible that the results of this study are not a reflection of the inability of 
this paradigm to work, but rather an establishment of the lower limits of 
group identification necessary to influence processing of evaluative 
information. 
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"The study of intergroup relations has come irrevocably to the 
foreground as a result of the actualities in human affairs today: The sharp 
razor's edge between war and peace in a tense world, the dependence of nation 
upon nation for the existence and development of each" (Shed,  1966, p. 10). 
Were it not for the date of this quote, one would think this was a 
summary of current group c o ~ c t s  in f i c a ,  the Middle East, or central 
Europe. Because of the intense human suffering caused by conflict between 
groups, the challenge remains for social psychologists to attempt to grasp the 
complex nature of intergroup relations. Sherif defines a group as  a social unit 
that "consists of a number of individuals who, at any given time, have role and 
status relationships with one another, stabilized in some degree, and who 
also possess a set of values or norms regulating the attitudes and behavior of 
individual members" (1966, p. 10). This definition implies a dynamic, 
interactive relationship in which the p u p  members contribute, but also draw 
from the collective properties of the group (Bornewasser & Bober, 1987; 
Rabbie & Horowitz, 1988). Intergroup behavior is interaction that occurs 
based solely on the individual's association or membership in certain social 
groups. Group membership by itself, however, does not explain conflicts and 
confrontations that arise between groups and attachment that group 
members feel towards their group and its members. The multifaceted nature 
of group membership was addressed by Tajfel(1978) when he suggested three 
components of group membership; a cognitive component, an evaluative 
component, and an emotional component. The cognitive component involves 
the person's knowledge that they belong to the group, by whatever criterion 
the group has established for membership. The evaluative component is that 
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part of group membership about which the individual makes a positive or 
negative value connotation. The emotional component concerns how one feels 
about one's own group membership, fellow group members and other groups 
and their members. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) examined 
the rnultidunensional nature of group membership and intergroup relations 
in a setting naturally conducive to the manipulation and study of group 
boundaries; that of summer camp. 
In  S h e d s  classic demonstrations, two groups of campers were 
independently and arbitrarily established. Prior to each experiment the boys 
had interacted as members of the camp, but under their arbitrary group 
identscations they were in  competition with one another. The study was 
designed to provide optimally competitive and frustrating situations for the 
boys. The competition and frustration accentuated group boundaries and 
created strong ingroup bias (Sherif et al., 196 I), an evaluative bias in favor of 
members of the perceiver's group (Brewer, 1979). The arbitrary group 
boundaries were subsequently diffused when a superordinate goal was 
introduced by the experimenters which required joint effort by both groups. 
Ingroup bias is not manifested exclusively in evaluations concerning ingroups 
and outgroups, but also can be manifested behaviorally. The Sherif et al. 
(1961) stuches provide some of the earliest experimental documentation of 
behavioral consequences resulting from group membership. 
Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) stated that the concept of ingroup bias 
rests on the perception of superiority of one's own group, although the 
perception of the outgroup is not necessarily depreciated. By definition then, 
the existence of an outgroup is implied, in that own group identity is in part 
defined by and contingent upon the perception of other groups (Tajfel, 1974a). 
Why do we form groups and what causes the positive evaluative and 
behavioral bias towards our own group? There are a number of theories which 
attempt to explain the formation of groups and the development of ingroup 
bias, 
Cognitive Differentiation Approach 
The Cognitive DBerentiation approach pion,  19 79; Wilder, 1978) used 
a perceptual and cognitive analysis of the intergroup situation. Wilder stated 
that through social categorization our social environment is divided into "two 
mutually exclusive categories" which are an ingroup and an outgroup. 
Individuals process information in a way that furthers the distinction 
between the ingroup and the outgroup. Ingroup members perceive congruities 
between themselves and other ingroup members, while perceptions of 
differences between themselves and members of the outgroup become more 
salient. These perceptions of ingroup similarity and outgroup Merentiation 
can lead to an individual's anticipation of further differences with outgroup 
members and congruities with ingroup members. This expectation leads to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy phenomena, as  individuals come to behave in a 
manner that elicits Werentiating information and behavior from outgroup 
members while confirming expectations about fellow ingroup members. The 
ingroup bias that results is believed to be a direct result of the social 
categorization process. 
Cultural Norm Hypothesis 
Tajfel(1970), in the Cultural Norm Hypothesis, stated that the 
socialization process in our culture has guided us to favor groups to  which we 
inherently belong on the basis of characteristics such as sex, race, o r  
nationality. The preference for own group members on the basis of perceived 
similarity is in contrast to our dislike of outgroup members due to perceived 
hssimilarity. The Cultural Norm Hypothesis assumes the presence of a 
"generic norm of behavior" towards others perceived as members of outgroups, 
in  which the most salient characteristics of the group serve as  the basis for 
the categorization. The salient characteristics of individuals with similar 
characteristics facilitates the perception of groups; subsequently, group 
members display positive bias towards ingroup members and negative bias 
toward outgroup members. Using the Cultural Norm Hypothesis, Tajfel was 
able to explain the basis by which groups were Werentiated, but left 
unanswered the question of why group Merentiations were important to 
individuals, in some cases so much so that group members were willing to 
give their lives in defense of group boundaries. Tajfel and other researchers 
observed the inadequacy in  the Cultural Norm Hypothesis to fully explain 
group membership and developed Social Identity Theory as a result. 
Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory resulted from refinement of the Cultural Norm 
Hypothesis a s  Tajfel and colleagues sought to more adequately explain the 
formation of groups (Billig & Tajfel1973; Turner, 1975). There are three 
main assumptions of Social Identity Theory (Turner & Brown, 1978). First, 
individuals define and evaluate themselves in terms of their social groups. 
Second, an individual's social identity is positive or negative according to the 
subjective cultural status of the groups which contribute t o  that identity. 
Third, comparisons with relevant outgroups on mutually significant 
dimensions provide the basis for determining the worth of own group 
membership to the individual. The comparisons are fueled by a drive, 
inherent to humans as social creatures, for a positive social identity. 
Underlying these assumptions are two main components of Social 
Identity Theory: a perceptual-cognitive component and a motivational 
component (Hong & Harrod, 1988; Ng, 1989). The motivational component 
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involves the desire for a positive social identity. When a group is identified as 
possessing qualities that are perceived as desirable by other members of 
society, individuals wil l  seek to associate themselves with those groups and 
concomitantly with those qualities; vicariously enhancing their own "value" or 
quality in society. Whether or not those qualities are better is the subjective 
judgment of the individual as he or she is confronted with the variety of 
groups and identifications that society presents (Ng, 1989). 
The perceptual-cognitive component involves categorization and 
comparison. Categorization of both social and nonsocial stimuli is seen as  
occurring due to humans' attempts to simplify their complex environment 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988; AUen & Wilder, 1975; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; 
Hamilton, 1981; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Tajfel, 1974; 1978; 1982a; Taylor 
& Moghaddam, 1987; Turner, 1982; Wilder, 1981). Referring to social 
categorization, Tajfel(1974b) says: 
In any complex society an individual confronts, from the beginning of 
his (& life a complex relationship into which he must fit himself. One of the 
most important and durable problems that is posed to an individual by his 
insertion into society is to h d ,  create, or define his place in these networks. 
Social categorization is a process of bringing together social objects or events 
in groups which are equivalent with regard to an individual's actions, 
intentions, attitudes and system of beliefs. (p. 67) 
It  is the perceived similarity of our "actions, intentions, attitudes and 
beliefs" with others, facilitated by categorization, that results in  the 
evaluative bias. The process of categorization accentuates congruities 
between the individual and their group as well as making differences with 
outgroups more salient (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Reykowski & Smolenska, 
1982). 
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Social comparison is the process by which intergroup differences are 
made salient, providing group members an opportunity to acquire a sense of 
the value of their group membership (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Festinger, 1954; 
Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). The comparison process is an attempt on the 
part of group members to gain information about the outgroup as a basis for 
evaluation to achieve distinctiveness and in doing so to discover more about 
own group status (Lemaine, Kastersztein, & Personnaz, 1978; Moscovici & 
Piacheler, 1978; Turner, 1975). The importance of the dimension of 
comparison, as well as the position of the groups on that dimension, affect the 
values associated with it (Commins & Lockwood, 1979). As the importance of 
the dimension increases, the values attributed to the ingroup become 
increasingly more positive and those associated with the outgroup become 
more negative (Branthwaite, Doyle, & Lightbown, 1979; Sachdev & Bourhis, 
1987; Turner & Brown, 1978). 
Historical Premises of Social Identitv 
The concept of social identity and its importance to human 
development did not originate with the research of Tajfel and associates; it 
has been examined since the emergence of psychology in the United States in  
the late 1800s through the writing and research of William James (1890). 
James divided the self, or that part of ourselves from which identity emerges, 
into an "I" and a "Me." The "I" referred to the subjective element of our 
consciousness while the "Me" referred to the outward expression of ourselves 
that formed the basis for other individual's impressions. The "Me" was 
further subdivided into material, spiritual, and social selves. Each of these 
components contributed to the individual's identity or self. The social self 
was  defined as how one portrayed oneself t o  others whose views are important 
to the individual. James said, "A man (sic) has as many social selves as there 
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are dlstinct groups of persons sabout whose opinion he cares" (p. 294). In the 
1920s and 1930s sociologist George Mead (1962) condensed James' "Me" 
component into a single "sociological me"; an internalization of our social 
roles. He proposed two stages critical to the development of the social self. 
First the individual determined what the attitudes of other individuals were 
towards him or her, both in social and nonsocial contexts. Second, the social 
self was shaped by the attitudes and opinions of the social groups of which the 
individual was a member. ,The self reached full development by combining 
the individual attitudes of others with pre-existing organized social or group 
attitudes, thereby " becoming an individual reflection of the general 
systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and the others are 
involved " (p. 158). In short, a si&cant portion of the whole of our identity is 
determined by group membership. Mead anticipated the work of Social 
Identity theorists when he said, " we also have to some extent positions in 
various groups which give a means of self-identfication, but there is back of 
all these matters a sense of things which in the whole we do better than other 
people do " (p. 205). The "me" that does things "better than other people do" 
to whom Mead refers, can be interpreted as a collective "me" including both 
the individual and other ingroup members, and the "sense of things ... we do 
better than other people do" can be thought of as ingroup bias. 
Empirical Support of Social Identity Theorv 
The desire to  acquire and maintain a positive social identification has 
been demonstrated in  a wide range of studies. Stephan (1977) found that 
individuals made more dispositional attributions to positive behaviors and 
fewer dispositional attributions to negative behaviors for ingroup members; 
that is, positive characteristics were more likely to be associated with the 
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ingroup, thereby enhancing the subjective worth ofthat partjcular group's 
membership (Pettigrew, 1979). 
&own and Wade (1987) measured intergroup atfitudes involved in a 
task with a superordinate goal that required cooperation among aU groups 
while simultaneously manipulating the saLience of the group boundaries. 
Results showed that in situations in which the group's roles were not clearly 
defined, attitudes toward the outgroup were less friendly. According to  Social 
Identity Theory this less friendly attitude i s  attributable to the need of the 
groups to Merentiate and gain group identification. The same task was 
utilized in the second part of the study; however, the group boundaries were 
made salient to subjects, and more friendly atLitudes were reported toward 
the outgroup. The salience of the group boundaries dowed subjects to make 
clear group differentiations; the friendly attitudes toward outgroup members 
were probably more indicative of a sense of relief at ha 
Merentiations than an expression of friendship for outgroup members. The 
superordinate goal placed an environmental demand on both groups to 
cooperate to meet the goal; had Brown and Wade (1987) assessed attitudes 
after the goal had been met, it seems likely that the groups would have 
displayed inddference in their evaluations as predicted by Social Identity 
Theory. 
Turner, Brown, and Tajfel(1979) found that subjects sacrificed 
personal gain to maximize group Merences. Results of  this study 
demonstrated that when the opportunity for the group boundaries to become 
more salient was presented, subjects took it, even at the expense of personat 
gain. The Turner et al. (1979) and Bro and Wade (1987) studies provide 
evidence for the desire in humans for group membership, due to the fact that 
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group membership is one vehicle for the attainment of  social identity, an 
integral part of one's overall sense of self. 
There is substantial documentation that an increase in the salience of 
group membership leads to marked ingroup favoritism (Boyanowski & Men, 
1973; Doise, 1978; Hensley & Duval, 1976; White, 1977; Worchel, Andreoh, & 
Folger, 1977). Ellemers and Van 
status group members showed more ingroup identification than members of 
low status groups, probably due to the positive identity associated with high 
status group membership. Hogg and Sunderland (1991) demonstrated that 
when subjects were assigned to a low self esteem condition and categorized, 
they discriminated significantly more against the experimental outgroup 
members as compared to experimental ingroup members. Along similar lines 
a number of studies (Branthwaite et al., 1979; Sacbdev & Bourhis, 1984; 
Simon & Brown, 1987) have looked at the effects of minoritylmajority status 
on intergroup evaluations and found results consistent with predictions from 
Social Identity Theory. The results indicated that minorities were generally 
less fair in evaluations of majority group members as compared to mioority 
group members, and that minority members laid pmticdar stress on their 
group membership as  opposed to majority group members. The majority 
group members' desire for positive group identity had been satisfied, which 
lessened their immediate emphasis on group membership as a means of 
attaining a positive social identity. It has been demonstrated, however, that 
should the majority group members' group status become threatened, they 
would act to stabilize the status relationships and maintain their superior 
standing (Hogg, 1988). 
The study of the dynamics of intergroup relaLions in a laboratory, as 
cited above, would not have been possible were it not for the seminal work 
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done by Rabbie and Horowitz (1969) and Tajfel, Flarnent, Billig, and Bundy 
(1 9 7 I), described below. The challenge in the study of intergroup relations in  a 
laboratory was to discover a means of removing the phenomena fiom the 
environment while still preserving the foci of study, which were group 
boundaries and subsequent ingroup bias. 
Origins of Laboratory Studv of Intergroup Relations 
The laboratory study of intergroup relations appeared to be inherently 
impossible due to the complex and relatively uncontrolled nature of our social 
environment. This was the predicament facing researchers as they attempted 
to isolate specific factors that facilitated group formation (Brown, Tajfel, & 
Turner, 1980; T u r n e r ,  Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). Observation of intergroup 
relations in the  environmentally controlled atmosphere of a laboratory 
required the establishment of "minimal" conditions, which would establish 
group facilitation, without the myriad of social factors present in  the 
environment that would confound precise analyses of ingroup bias. Rabbie & 
Horowitz (1969) attempted to establish minimal conditions by dividing 
subjects into groups labeled "blue" and "green1' completely arbitrarily with no 
other tasks involved, except for evaluative group trait measures. The study's 
failure to find ingroup bias provided a basis for further research that sought 
to establish the base or lower limits of group designation (Brewer, 1979; 
Tajfel, 1982b). 
Tajfel and colleagues at  Bristol University also sought to develop a 
parahgm that would establish the lower limits of group designation, and still 
elicit the group effect. The minimal group paradigm was the result of their 
efforts (Tajfel, 1970, 1979; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Turner & 
Brown, 1978)- The minimal group parahgm required the following six 
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criteria of the experimental situation be met in order to elicit ingroup bias 
(Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987): 
1. There should be no face to face interaction between subjects in the 
ingroups, in the outgroups, and especially between the groups. 
2. The individual's group membership should always remain 
anonymous. 
3. There should be no instrumengal or  rational link between the criteria 
for intergroup categorization and the rewards subjects would 
allocate to ingroup and outgroup members. 
4. The rewards should not have any utilitarian value for the subjects 
making them. 
5. Subjects should be presented with a number of different options in 
terms of how they allocate rewards to ingroups and outgroups. 
The allocation options with which the subjects were presented included 
fairness, maximum joint profit (MJP), maximum ingroup profit NIP) and 
maximum Merence in favor of the ingroup (Turner, 1983). In the minimal 
group design, fairness implied that subjects allocate equal rewards to both 
ingroup and outgroup members. MJP is similar, but offered subjects the 
opportunity to maximize allocations across both ingroup and outgroup 
members. In the MIP condition the ingroup received the most profit 
regardless of what the outgroup received. Should the subjects choose the 
maximum difference, they would be maximizing the amount of difference in 
rewards received between ingroup members and outgroup members. In terms 
of the amount of reward received, the maximum Merence allocation option 
was not the most profitable option for the subjects, but it allowed the greatest 
Merentiation between the rewards received by the groups. 
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6. Rewards should be made as important as possible to the subjects so 
that they are real decisions about concrete rewards. 
Using these six experimental criteria the following paradigm was 
developed. In the first half' of the initial study subjects were asked to estimate 
the number of dots appearing on a screen. They were informed that during 
these dot estimation tasks some people tended consistently to overestimate, 
while others consistently underestimated the number of dots. The estimates 
were taken and ostensibly scored by a confederate; subjects then were 
assigned to  groups, supposedly on the basis of their overestimation or 
underestimation, while in actuality group assignment was random. Adhering 
to the guidelines already mentioned, subjects were informed privately about 
their group membership. The method of measuring ingroup bias involved 
subjects distributing monetary rewards via allocation matrices. The matrices 
were constructed to provide three allocation opportunities. One involved 
giving awards to two ingroup members other than the subject. Another 
matrix involved giving awards to two members of the outgroup and a third 
included giving awards to one member of each group. The results lead to the 
conclusion, subsequently well documented, that simple categorization of 
subjects into ingroups and outgroups leads to differential evaluation and 
discrimination in  favor of the ingroup (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Doise et al., 1972; 
Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975); but 
see Rabbie and Horowitz (1969). Studies utilizing the minimal group 
paradigm have demonstrated ingroup bias regardless of status hfferentials 
(Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; 1987); in the absence of competition or even 
contact between the groups (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Moghaddam & Stringer, 
1986; Platow et al., 1990; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Tajfel & Billig, 1974); and 
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also with belief and attitudinal similarities between the ingroups and the 
outgroups (Men & Wilder, 1975; Diehl, 1988). 
The basis of the categorization may at first appear rather "trivial" and 
"unimportant" to the observer, as Tajfel himself noted (1978). The minimal 
group parahgm filters environmental noise that enhances, affects, or  bstorts 
intergroup relations, so  that the entire process of intergroup relations is 
brought down to an observable, controlled function. The triviality of the 
minimal conditions is apparent only from a non-laboratory context 
(Moghaddam & Stringer, 1986). In a laboratory environment, the minimal 
group distinctions are believed to assume the same categorizational power as  
societal identifications such as gender and race (Amancio, 1989). The 
categorization sets up assumptions and expectations for target persons' 
characteristics which may influence the perceivers' affect and possible 
behavior towards the target (Desforges et al., 1991; Howard & Rothbart, 
1980; Smith & Zarate, 1990). The assumptions and expectations of the 
target person generated in minimal group paradigms are thought to be 
conceptually equivalent to stereotypes, in  that they are consensual beliefs of 
one group concerning the defining characteristics of another group (Ashmore & 
Del Boca, 1981). The assumptions and expectations in the minimal group 
paradigm do, however, differ from stereotypes in that they are not held 
chronically by the individual and are based on minimal group identity, as 
opposed to cognitively well established societal identities which provide the 
bases for stereotypes. 
Cognitive Representations of Stereotypes 
The study of stereotypes as cognitive structures mediating social 
information processing has become a subject of much interest (Devine, 1989; 
Dovidio et al., 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Stephan, 1989). Research on the 
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cognitive origins of stereotyping is based on the primary assumption that 
stereotyping begins with categorization, as individuals categorize the complex 
environment, they stereotype to simplify processing of information related to 
groups, which emerge from categorization (Fiske, 1989). 
Unlike information processing about nonsocial objects, there is a self 
relevant dimension involved in social information processing so that 
categorizations are weighted with stereotyped evaluations and value 
judgements related to ingroup and outgroup membership (Stephan, 1977). 
Doviho et al. (1986) explored the ingroup dimension ofcognitive processing by 
adapting a semantic priming paradigm developed by Rosch and Mervis 
(1975) from a nonsocial to a social context. Rosch and Mervis tested the 
speed of access to information by priming a target word with a category. The 
speed of the reaction times to the target words were faster for examples of the 
primed category. Reaction times are one means of measuring the presence of 
cognitive structures that facilitate the processing of social and nonsocial 
categorizational information (Bettin, McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Dovidio et al., 
1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The speed of the 
reaction time is assumed to reflect the accessibility of the information. That 
is, the more frequently a cognitive pathway is used, the quicker that 
information can be accessed (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins, King, & 
Mavin, 1982). 
Dovidio e t  al. (1986) substituted the nonsocial categories used by Rosch 
and Mervis (1975) of furniture and fruit with the racial categories white and 
black. These semantic primes were presented with stereotyped, evaluative 
traits of both African Americans and Caucasians and reaction times were 
recorded. The results revealed faster reaction times to Caucasian stereotyped 
traits and positive characteristics when preceded by the prime white than 
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when preceded by the prime black. Subjects also responded faster to negative 
character traits and African American stereotyped traits when followed by 
the prime black. It should also be noted that all the subjects in this study 
were Caucasians, which demonstrates ingroup facilitation of information 
processing. 
In a similar study, Zarate and Smith (1990) tested the speed of access 
of racial and gender categories depending on both the target's and the 
perceiver's own category membership. The target in this case was a picture of 
another person. Subjects' reaction times were recorded for each picture 
categorized by race and sex. They found that females were categorized faster 
by sex and males faster by race. It was also found that subjects categorized 
same sex targets more quickly than opposite sex targets, again showing a 
differential speed of categorization for ingroup members. 
Dovidio, Perdue, Gaertner, and Ellyson (in press) and Perdue, Dovidio, 
Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) further adapted the semantic priming paradigm 
from racial group primes to the ingroup-outgroup designators, we and they and 
us and them. It was hypothesized that subjects would identify with the self- 
relevant pronoun and react faster to we and us followed by positive character 
traits. The primes were masked by a series of X's and presented for a period 
of 75 mfiseconds. As predcted subjects' reaction times overall, were faster 
when the primes we and us  were followed by positive character traits, as 
compared to the primes they and them when followed by positive character 
traits. These results provide further evidence of an ingroup advantage in 
speed of processing, even though the primes were presented in a manner that 
&d not allow conscious or controlled processing. The results also offer 
evidence of the powerful affect self-relevance of stimuli has on cognitive 
processing. The ingroup designators of m and us were reacted to more quickly 
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than the primes they and them because self-relevant information in social 
judgments has  been demonstrated to be highly accessible and more efficiently 
processed margh, 1984; Markus, 1977; Markus & Smith, 1981; Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979)~ biased toward positive information (Bradley, 1978; Greenwald, 
1980; Markus, 1980), and more easily retrieved (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; 
Rogers, 1981; R o g e r s  et al., 1979; ROSS & Sicoly, 1979). These studies 
indicated that positive identity associated with ingroup membership 
established llcognitive reference points" which facilitated processing of 
positive information, as it related to ingroup membership (Rosch & Mervis, 
1975). The min ima l  group paradigm has demonstrated that these "reference 
points" can be created under environmentally controlled conditions in the 
laboratory. The question which then arises is whether the minimal conditions 
and subsequent identifications are sufficient to facilitate differential 
information processing of the evaluative traits in the same manner that 
Dovidio et al. (in press)  demonstrated with cognitively well established racial 
group identdications and self-relevant pronouns. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. It was predicted that random assignment of subjects 
into one of two groups (LAJor YOF) established arbitrarily through the 
minimal group paradigm would elicit differentially positive evaluations for 
ingroup members on a series of evaluative trait scales (see Appendix D). If 
upheld, this hypothesis, while already demonstrated in previous studies 
(Brewer & Silver, 1978; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Platow et al., 1990) would 
have served as a manipulation check for the attainment of ingroup bias. 
Hypothesis 2. The semantic priming parahgm, through reaction times 
to positive and negat ive  character traits, was predicted to measure the 
immediate effects of minimal group identity on the processing of evaluative 
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information about one's own group and an outgroup. As in the Perdue et al. 
(1990) and Dovidio et al. (in press) studies, it was expected that the ingroup 
and outgroup labels would affect the processing of the traits. It was predicted 
that the ingroup designator (LAJor YOF) would activate self relevant 
cognitive paths resulting in faster reaction times to positive character traits 
(Collins & Loftus, 19'75; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986; Foss, 1982; Neely, 1977; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). Reaction 
times to negative traits following outgroup labels were predicted t o  be similar 
to reaction times to the neutral prime of house. This is consistent with Social 
Identity Theory, which concludes that the minimal group paradigm may lead 
to ingroup enhancement but not necessarily outgroup derogation (Brewer, 
1979; Dovimo et al., 1986; Platow et al., 1990; Rabbie & Wakens, 1971). 
Hypothesis 3. Subjects administered the evaluative trait scales after 
completing the semantic priming task were predicted t o  show more evaluative 
ingroup bias then the other half of subjects who completed the evaluative 
trait scales prior to  the semantic priming task. This effect was predicted due 
to the longer amount of time subjects given the evaluative trait scales after 






Forty-eight subjects (16 male, 32 female) participated in this 
experiment for extra credit in introductory psychology courses at Drake 
University. 
Procedure 
This experiment was conducted to establish that arbitrary group labels 
used in the second experiment did not Merentially cue positive or negative 
trait representations in memory. The group labels were nonsense syllables, 
previously established as cueing neither positive or negative trait 
representations (Perdue et al., 1990). This study followed the procedure used 
in Dovidio et al. (in press) for stimulus presentation and reaction time 
recording, as follows. 
"The purpose of this experiment is to determine the speed of 
categorization of people and objects. Your task wiU be to look a t  the computer 
screen on which the name of a group of people or objects like dog or tree will 
appear, and to read the name aloud and think about what you feel the typical 
member of that group is like. After a brief time the screen will go blank; then 
a second word like shady, gnarled, faithful, or friendly will appear, and you 
must decide as quickly and accurately a s  possible whether the second word 
can ever be true of that group (first word) or is always false. You will inhcate 
your decision by pressing a computer key. Press "M or Z" for yes and "M or Z" 
19 
(order counterbalanced between subjects) for no. After you see the second 
word, hit one of the keys sharply and release. You should respond as fast and 
accurately as possible: we are recorhng both speed and the key you hit. We 
will begin with a set of practice trials using the categories dog and tree. We 
will now pause to answer any questions that you have and to allow you time 
to think of the typical tree and dog. 
After the practice trials you wi l l  be presented with the names of groups 
of people, XEH, YOF, QUG, GIW, WUH, LAJ, taken from an earlier visual 
perception study. Again respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
whether the second word such as kind, bad, or trustworthy can ever be true or 
is always false of the groups of people classified as XFH, YOF, QUG, GIW, 
WUH, and LAJ". 
The nonsense syllables were presented in the following pairs XEH: and 
YOF, QUG and GIW and WUH and LAJ. The order of pair presentation was 
randomized within subjects. 
The Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) reaction time procedure was used 
in which group labels were presented for 250 msec at the central fixation 
point and then disappeared. After a 250 msec delay the character trait 
appeared for 250 msec. Subject's were instructed to press the yes or no key (2 
or M) in response to whether the trait word could ever describe that label or  is  
always false for that label. Each label-trait combination, as  well as the order 
of trait presentation was counterbalanced within subjects. The order of the 
yes and no keys was counterbalanced between subjects. 
Results 
A two (positive and negative character trait) by three (nonsense 
syllables) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the reaction times 
to establish that group labels dtd not elicit Merential reaction times to 
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either the positive or negative character traits. The analysis was conducted 
on the labels YOF, W, and GIW. The labels QUG, WUH and XEH were 
excluded from the analysis due to recording error. Results revealed no 
differences in reaction times to positive or  negative character traits after the 
nonsense syllables, F (1, 138) = .32,p = 373. In addition, there were no 
nonsense syllable by evaluation interactions among the three labels F (2, 138) 
= 1.32, p = -269. 
Discussion 
Based on these results the nonsense syllables YOF and LAJwere 




Seventy-two subjects (36 male, 36 female) randomly assigned to 12 
groups of 6 (3 male and 3 female) were used in this study. Subjects were 
recruited from introductory psychology courses at Drake University and 
received extra credit for their participation. 
Procedure 
Subjects were assigned randomly to groups of six and told the purpose 
of this study was to examine certain properties of visual judgment. Two 
experimenters, both white, college aged males conducted the experiment for 
all subjects following the same procedure. 
Dot Estimation Task. As in the original Tajfel et al. (1971) study, after 
informed consents were obtained from each subject, 40 images of varying 
numbers of dots were presented to the subjects (see Appendix E). 
Experimenter 1 instructed subjects as follows, "On the screen in front of you a 
number of dots wiU appear. Following each presentation, please estimate the 
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number of dots that appear on the screen and record your estimation on the 
score sheets that the experimenter has handed to you. Please use one score 
sheet per dot presentation, any questions." Subjects were seated at 
classroom style desks in a semicircle in front of a projection screen. Upon 
completion of the dot presentation task, Experimenter 1 ostensibly scored the 
estimation sheets, while actually randomly assigning subjects to either the 
YOF or LAJ groups. Subjects were then told, "because of a reduced subject 
pool, we wil l  take advantage of your presence by having you participate in 
another study examining cognitive processing efficiency. In order to facllitate 
data recording, you will be placed into one of two groups (YOF or LAJ) based 
on your performance in the previous dot estimation task." Experimenter 1 
lead one of the experimental groups (YOFor LAS) into an adjacent room for 
the semantic priming task. Experimenter 2 lead the remaining group (YOF or 
LAJ) into a separate room to complete the semantic priming task. The order 
of experimenter, group label, and room was counterbalanced. 
Semantic Priming Task 
The next phase of the experiment involved a semantic priming task as 
used by Dovidio et al. (1986). Half of the subjects completed an evaluative 
checkhst prior to the semantic priming task (see Appendix D), the other half 
completed the checklist after they finished the priming task. Subjects were 
seated at a computer and read the following instructions: 
"The purpose of this experiment is to determine the speed of 
categorization of people and objects. Your task will be to  look at  the computer 
screen on which the name of a group of people or objects like dog or tree d 
appear, and to read the name aloud and think about what you feel the typical 
member of that group is like. After a brief time the screen v d l  go blank; then 
a second word like shady, gnarled, friendly, or faithful will appear, and you 
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must decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether the second word 
can ever be true of that group (first word) or is always false. You will indicate 
your decision by pressing a computer key. Press "M-Zfl for yes and "M-Z" for 
no. After you see the second word, hit one of the keys sharply and release. 
You should respond as fast and accurately as possible: we are recording both 
speed and the key you hit. We will begin with a set of practice trials using the 
categories tree and dog. We will now pause to answer any questions that you 
have and to allow you time to think of the typical tree and dog (experimenter 
observes subjects complete the practice trials and ensures that the computer 
task is understood). 
Now you wiU be presented with the names of the groups of people, LAJ 
and YOF, whose membership was determined in the previous dot estimation 
task. Again respond as quickly and accurately as possible whether the second 
word such as kind, bad, or trustworthy can ever be true or is always false of the 
groups of people classified as LAJand YOF." 
The order of group label appearance in the computer task was 
counterbalanced; for half the subjects YOF was presented first and for the 
other half LAJ was presented first. 
Subjects in the precomputer task checklist condition were instructed as 
follows: "Before we begin, we would like you to respond to a few questions. 
Using the scales I have handed to you, indlcate the extent to which a member 
of the LAJ or YOF group ranks on this characteristic. When you are finished I 
wil l  collect the packets and get you started on the computer task." 
The reaction time task followed the guidelines of Bargh and 
Pietromonaco (1982). The group designators (YOF and LAJ) and house were 
presented as primes for 250 msec, at the central fixation point. After a 250 
msec delay the target word (e.g., good, bad, drafty) appeared at the central 
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fixation point. Subject's responded yes or no as previously instructed. Each 
label-trait combination, a s  well as order of trait adjective presentation was 
counterbalanced within subjects. Half of the subjects responded yes with the 
letter Z and no with the letter M, for the other half of the subjects the order 
was reversed. Upon completion of the semantic priming task, subjects were 
debriefed thoroughly as to the true nature of the study including the rationale 
for the deception involved. 
Manipulation Check 
Subjects were given 2 lists of 15 bipolar positive and negative 
adjectives using a 9 point, Likert- type scale (see Appendix D) to rate ingroup 
and outgroup members. They were instructed to "indicate on the scales the 
extent to which a typical member of the W o r  YOF group ranks on these 
characteristics." The adjectives were assembled from three previous ingroup- 
outgroup studies (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Platow 
et al., 1990) as measures of ingroup bias. These measures sought to 
demonstrate that the dot estimation task was successful in establishing the 
ingroup bias effect. Half of the subjects were given the evaluative checkhst 
prior to the semantic priming task and the other half after the priming task. 
Half of the checklists, in each condition, began with the LAJ group and half 




A two (group label) by two (group rated) by fifteen (trait adjective) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on mean evaluative trait scale 
ratings to determine whether the minimal group paradigm established 
intergroup boundaries between the LAJ and YOF groups and ingroup bias for 
members of both groups. Results indicated differential ratings on the trait 
scales depending upon which group was rated, F (1,70)= 14.12, p=.000 1. 
However, the signrficant effect was not in the predicted direction, as subjects 
in both YOF and LAJ groups rated outgroup members more favorably than 
ingroup members (Means 6.287 outgroup vs. 5.9 19 ingroup). This finding is 
further supported by the nonsignificant group label by group rated interaction, 
indicating that subjects were consistent in their higher ratings of outgroups 
and lower ratings of ingroups, regardless of the group to which they belonged, 
F (1,70)= .08, p= -785 (see Table I). 
A group label by trait interaction did reach significance, F (14,57)= 
3.20, p= .OO 1, so that subjects' ratings, on certain adjectives, were Merent  
dependmg on the minimal group label. Because the main effect of group rated 
was not in the predicted direction, the group label by trait interaction was not 
further explored statistically. 
Reaction Times 
A two (group label) by two (order of presentation) by two @rime) by 
two (evaluative adjective) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed on subjects' reaction times. 
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There was a significant main effect of prime as subjects responded 
significantly faster to the prime YOF than to the prime LAJ (Means 792.149 
vs. 805.679), F (3,64)= 26.88, p=.0001. This differential response t o  the 
primes was unexpected, a s  pretesting had established no Werential reaction 
times to either prime. The positive or negative evaluative nature of adjectives 
following the primes also affected reaction times. Subjects' reaction times to 
the positive character traits (Mean 754.151) were significantly faster than 
reaction times to negative character traits (Mean 843.676), F (3,64)=18.952, 
p=.OOOl. 
Group membership did not ddferentially affect reaction times, 
F (3,64)= .418, p . 7 4 1 .  There was no main effect of order, as subjects' reaction 
times &d not diger whether they completed the computer task before or after 
filling out the evaluative trait scales, F (3,64)=.653, p=.584, and there were no 
significant two-way interactions involving the order condition. 
There was a sigmficant prime by evaluation interaction, F ( 3,64)= 5.3, 
p=.003. Subjects in both minimal groups responded quickest to positive 
traits after the YOF prime and slowest to negative traits after the W prime. 
Reaction times to both primes (YOF, LR/) did not vary with group 
membership, F (3,64)=. 1682, pz.9 17. Minimal group membership did not 
affect subjects' responses to either the YOFor LAJprimes. In addition group 
membership did not interact with the evaluative quality of adjectives that 
followed the primes, F (3,64)= 1.93, p=. 133. YOF and LAJ group members 
responded at similar rates to positive and negative adjectives. 
Contrary to the main hypothesis, the group by prime by evaluation 
interaction was not significant, F (3,64)= -560, p=.643 (see Table 2). Subjects 
in both minimal groups did not respond faster to positive, as compared to 
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negative traits after their own group prime, nor to positive as compared to 
negative traits after the outgroup prime. 
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Table 1 









Ingroup Outeoup Ingroup 
Difficult to like 5.86 1 6.278 6-75 
Passive1 
Forceful 5.139 5.222 4,667 
Trustworthy1 
Untrustworty 5.9 17 6.583 6,222 
Friendly1 
Dishonest 6.028 6.528 6.556 
Unselfish1 
Selfish 5.61 1 5.889 5.528 
Flexible1 
Rigid 5.639 5.944 6,194 
Intelhgentl 
Unintelligent 6.167 6. "i"8 6.86 1 
Help full 
Unhelpful 6.139 6.472 6,256 
FairIUnfair 
6.111 6.7712 6.5 
WarmlCold 
5.750 6.333 6.389 
StrongNVeak 
5.556 6.389 6,306 
Cooperative1 
C omp e titive 5.722 5.778 5.083 
Overall Means 5.785 6.2 79 6.054 
Table 2 
Mean ~ e a c t i o n  Times of YOF and LAJ Minimal Group Members to Positive 




IWFOUP Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
@OF) (LAJ) (LA4 @OF) 
Positive 660.5 805.13 829.44 714.5 
trait 




A body of past research involving the minimal group paradigm has led 
to the wel.kh.mwnted conclusion that simple categohiation of subjects into 
ingroups and outgroups leads to Werentid evaluation and &scximination in 
favor of the ingroup (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Doise et al., 1972; Platow et al., 
1990; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975; but see Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969). 
Studies utilizing the minimal group paradigm have demonstrated ingroup 
bias regardless of status differentials (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; 1987); in the 
absence of competition or even contact between groups Prewer & Silver, 
1978; Moghaddam & Stringer, 1986; Platow et al., 1990; Rabbie & Wilkins, 
1971; Tajfel & B a g ,  1974); and also with belief and attitudind similaribes 
between ingroups and outgroups (Men & Wilder, 1975; DieN, 1988). 
The question remained whether the ~ n i m a l  conditions and group 
identifications resulting from the m al group p a r a & p  are sufficient to 
influence processing of evaluative info 
cognitively well established racial labels and self-referent pronouns @ovidio 
et al., 1986; Dovidio et al., in press; Perdue et ale, 1990). Dovidio et d. (1986) 
presented the racial categories white and black as semantic primes to 
stereotyped, evaluative traits of both 
Subjects were instructed to indicate whether the trait could ever be true of 
individuals belonging to either ofthe groups or was always false. The results 
revealed faster reaction times to Caucasian stereotyped traits and positive 
characteristics when preceded by the p white than when preceded by the 
prime black. Subjects also responded faster to negafive character traits and 
American stereotyped traits when followed by the prime black. T t  
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should be noted that all the subjects in this study were Caucasian, which 
demonstrates ingroup facilitation of information processing. Dovidlo et al. (in 
press) and Perdue et al. (1990) further adapted the semantic priming 
parahgm from racial group primes to the ingroup-outgroup designators, we 
and they and us and them. It was hypothesized that subjects would identify 
with the self-relevant pronoun and react faster to we and us followed by 
positive character traits. The primes were masked by a series of X's and 
presented for 75 milliseconds. As predicted subjects' reaction times were 
faster when the primes we and us were followed by positive character traits, 
as compared to the primes they and them when followed by positive character 
traits. These results provide further evidence of an ingroup advantage in 
speed of processing, even though the primes were presented in a manner that 
did not allow conscious or controlled processing. The results demonstrate the 
powerful affect self-relevance of stimuli has on cognitive processing. The 
ingroup designators of we and us were reacted to more quickly than the primes 
they and them because self-relevant information in social judgments has been 
demonstrated to be highly accessible and more efficiently processed (Bargh, 
1984; Markus, 1977; Markus & Smith, 198 1; Ross & Sicoly, 1979), biased 
toward positive information (Bradley, 1978; Greenwald, 1980; Markus, 1980), 
and more easily retrieved (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Rogers, 1981; Rogers et al., 
1979; Ross & Sicoly, 1979). These studies indicated that positive identity 
associated with ingroup membership established "cognitive reference points" 
which facilitated processing of positive information, as it related to ingroup 
membership (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). The intent of the present study was to 
examine whether arbitrary group labels, as established in the minimal group 
paradigm, could facilitate information processed about group characteristics 
as measured by a reaction time task. 
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Hypothesis 1 of this study predicted subjects would rate ingroup 
members higher on a series of evaluative trait scales, as a manipulation 
check of ingroup bias. As reported in the results, subjects did not rate ingroup 
members higher on the evaluative trait scales as predicted; instead, mean 
ratings of outgroup members were significantly higher than ratings of ingroup 
members of both minimal groups and with both primes. 
The absence of ingroup bias in subjects participating in the minimal 
group task, a well-replicated paradigm, raises methodological and theoretical 
questions. The minimal group paradigm format in this study was patterned 
after the Tajfel et al. (1971) seminal study, using dot estimation to randomly 
dwide subjects into two groups, but with some modifications. Tajfel's 
population consisted of 14-15 year old boys from a boarding school, divided 
into groups of eight. The present study used college students, 
counterbalanced for gender and run in groups of three. Tajfel measured 
ingroup bias through allocation matrices, while in the present study 
evaluative trait scales were used as a measure of ingroup bias. However, the 
minimal group paradigm has been replicated many times in studies with 
similar characteristics to the present study (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Doise et 
al., 1972; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). These studies do differ on a few points, 
namely demographic characteristics of subjects and the use of allocation 
matrices as  measures of ingroup bias. Brewer and Silver (1978) and Rabbie 
and Wilkens (1971) recorded data from 72 subjects, the same number of 
subjects participating in the present study. Subjects were divided into groups 
of six by Brewer and Silver (1978) and three in Rabbie and Wilkens' (1971) 
study. As mentioned earlier, subjects in this study were divided into groups of 
three. 
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Two of the three studies had subjects of the same gender, with females 
used in Brewer and Silver (1978) and males used in  Rabbie and Wilkens 
(1971). Gender was balanced across all groups in my study, which may 
partially account for the nonsignficant reaction time results. Deschamps and 
Doise (1974, cited in Doise & Dann, 1976) studied the effects of gender on 
intergroup performance evaluations. Ingroup bias was reported when groups 
were homogeneous in gender, using one female group and one male group. In 
the second condition groups were balanced, with equal numbers of females 
and males and ingroup bias was not found on evaluations, as in the present 
study. Deschamps and Doise (1974, cited in Doise & Dann, 1976) explained 
their findings as evidence of more cognitively established gender group 
identifications weakening minimal group labels' influence on evaluative 
information processing. Amancio (1989) designed a study examining how 
gender stereotyped character traits affected ingroup and outgroup ratings. 
The stereotyped male identity in society includes quahties such as autonomy 
and self' distinctiveness, quahties which are conducive to ingroup favoritism 
as measured on evaluative trait scales. Amancio (1989) reported that in 
experimental conditions with evaluative traits not thought to be gender 
stereotyped, male subjects' behavior was more reflective of differentiating 
between groups and ingroup bias than female subjects. The traits used in the 
present study were compiled from several studies involving male and female 
subjects. Other studies with mixed gender populations (Brown & Wade, 
1987; Desforges et al., 199 1) did not find an effect of gender on evaluative 
ratings. It should be noted that the two studies mentioned above had 
extensive interaction within and between the experimental groups. The inter 
and intragroup contact may have strengthened subjects' identxfication with 
their group and subsequently reduced gender effects on evaluations. 
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In her review of minimal group studies Brewer (1979) states that the 
original Tajfel e t  al. (1971) minimal group paradigm represents extreme 
lower boundary conditions. Most studies since that time have used M e r e n t  
experimental conditions to enhance the ingroup bias phenomenon such as 
competition, group outcome, outgroup similarity, and categorization salience. 
The implication here is that in the most extreme minimal conditions the 
experimental population should be as homogeneous as possible. The 
population homogeneity would then ensure that evaluative measures of 
minimal groups are not biased by pre-existing societal identscations. In 
spite of this knowledge the original Tajfel et al. (1971) paradigm was selected 
for use in this study. Because a study of the affects of minimal group identity 
on evaluative processing had not been done and a lower level needed to be 
established. D u e  to recording error, analysis of the trait scales by gender is 
not possible in this study, so the effect of gender on intergroup evaluations 
cannot be determined. All three studies report the use of allocation matrices 
along with evaluative trait scales, competitive, andfor cooperative conditions. 
While these studies report ingroup bias, as measured by evaluative trait 
scales, examination of the results reveals consistencies with results of the 
present study. 
The trait  scales used by Brewer and Silver (1978) consisted of six 
bipolar traits of which only three demonstrated consistent ingroup bias. 
While Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) report ingroup bias through product and 
performance ratings they also note that subjects in anticipating competition 
and anticipating no competition conditions, in ratings taken before the task, 
felt the other group would do a better job. The same subjects also rated 
membership in the  other group as more attractive to them. Subjects in the no 
anticipation conation did not Merentially rate their group or the other 
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group's membership or potential task performance. This parallels the 
present study's findings, as subjects did not anticipate any competition or 
interaction with other group members, but significantly rated outgroup 
members higher than ingroup members. 
Similarly, Rabbie a n d  Elorowitz (1969) randomly dlvided subjects into 
groups labeled blue a n d  green, with no interaction, competition or 
anticipation thereof, and did not find ingroup bias. Interestingly in one 
condition, experimenters' flipped a coin prior to trait scale administration to 
see who would receive a reward for participation. Despite their knowledge of 
the arbitrary determination of which group received a reward, subjects rated 
ingroup members higher t h a n  outgroup members. The reward provided a 
salient basis for differentiation that facilitated ingroup bias. 
It appears that the occurrence of ingroup bias is contingent to an extent 
on either monetary rewards through allocation matrices or self esteem gains 
resulting from actual or anticipated competition or interaction. The 
allocation matrices imply that subjects wdl receive some reward themselves, 
just as they are allocating funds to others. Although the difference between 
trait ratings and distributing money to other subjects may seem insignificant, 
distributing money implies reciprocating rewards and may be more a 
reflection of self-interest a n d  potential self-gain than of ingroup bias as  
assumed (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). The presentation of the minimal 
group paradigm in the present study resembles those studies mentioned 
which did not find ingroup bias. Without more clearly defined Werentiation 
and an increased element of self-involvement, the minimal group 
identifications appear unlikely to become sufficiently cognitively established 
to influence information processing. 
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In Hypothesis 2 of this study it was predicted that reaction times to 
positive and negative character traits, with minimal group labels as primes, 
would measure the immediate effects of minimal group identity on the 
processing of evaluative information about one's own group and an outgroup. 
The ingroup designators (LAJ or YOF) were predicted to  activate self relevant 
cognitive paths, resulting in  faster reaction times to positive character traits 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Dovidio et al., in press; Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 
1986; Foss, 1982; Neely, 1977; Perdue et  al., 1990; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). 
This hypothesis was not supported, as subjects did not respond differentially 
to positive or negative character traits when primed by their ingroup label. 
However, because ingroup bias apparently was not established, as shown 
through the manipulation check, analyses of reaction time data can not be 
interpreted as supporting or refuting the main hypothesis of this study. 
In Hypothesis 3, it was predicted that subjects administered the 
evaluative trait scales after completing the computer task would show more 
evaluative ingroup bias than those subjects completing the evaluative trait 
scales before the computer task. As the results illustrate, the order of trait 
scale presentation did not afTect subjects' trait scale ratings of ingroup 
members. Brewer and Silver (1978) also found no effect of the order of 
presentation on evaluative trait scale ratings, either before or after the 
behavioral measure, similar to the current results. 
In spite of the shortcomings of this study, there are some points of 
interest worth noting. Contrary to pretesting results and previous research, 
subjects responded faster to the prime YOF than LAJ. These primes were 
selected from a group of nonsense syllables, established in a previous study 
as evaluatively neutral (Perdue et al., 1990). Pretesting with subjects drawn 
from the same population a s  this study showed no Merences in reaction 
times to either YOF or LM when presented as primes of positive and 
negative character traits. I n  the pretest subjects were instructed that YOF 
and LAJ were labels for groups of people, neither of which the subjects 
themselves were associated with. In the present study, subjects were aware 
that the labels referred to either their group or the other group, ostensibly 
determined by the dot estimation task. Whether this difference in 
methodology sigmficantly influenced reaction times in favor of the YOF group 
label is unclear. 
Another finding was subjects' quicker response times to positive than 
negative character traits across YOF and LAJ primes and group membership. 
This provides further support that the minimal group paradigm, as presented 
in this study, failed to establish a self-referential link between subjects and 
their minimal group labels. 
Because minimal group identity was not established in this study, it 
should not be concluded that minimal group labels cannot be reference points 
that would facihtate processing of positive and negative information. A test 
of this hypothesis requires clear determination that the minimal group 
paradigm formed group boundaries and established ingroup bias. 
In a future replication the Tajfel e t  al. (1971) paradigm could again be 
used in conjunction with a semantic priming task, but with an experimental 
population of either all male or all female subjects. Additionally, a mixed 
gender population should be used, but with more interaction between and 
within groups, a competitive element or a self esteem manipulation. It is 
possible that the results of this study are not a reflection of the inability of 
this paradigm to work, but rather an establishment of the lower limits of 
group identscation necessary to influence processing of evaluative 
information. 
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions to Participants 
Procedure 
Subjects were assigned randomly to groups of 6 (half male and half 
female), seated a t  desks in  a semicircle in front of a projection screen (room 
305 Olin), given informed consents, and instructed as follows: 
Experimenter 1- "The purpose of this study is to examine certain 
properties of visual perception.In order to study these perceptions we 
will have you do a perceptual task approximately 40 times. On the screen in 
front of you a number of images of dots will appear for 1000 milliseconds 
each. Following each of the 40 presentations, please estimate the number of 
dots that appear on the screen and record your estimation on the score sheet 
that was handed to you mxperimenter 2 distributes score sheets). Please 
make one estimation for each of the 40 dot presentations. When the dot 
presentations are completed we will collect and score your estimations. While 
your estimates are being scored please remain seated and do not talk with 
anyone else. Any questions?" 
After the dot estimation sheets was collected Experimenter 2 took 
them to an adjacent room and ostensibly scored them. He was actually 
randomly assigning subjects t o  either the LAJ or YOF groups. Groups always 
consisted of either 1 male and 2 females or 1 female and 2 males, in order to 
control for sex effects. After assigning subjects to their groups, Experimenter 2 
came back into the room and handed back the score sheets with the group 
label written on it and informed the subjects: 
Experimenter 2- "New research in the area of brain functioning has 
proposed that there is a link between visual perception and cognitive 
processing efficiency. We would like to take advantage of your presence by 
having you participate in a short computer task that measures cognitive 
processing eficiency. You have been assigned to one of two groups, YOF or 
LAJ, based on your performance on the visual perception study just 
completed. Again your group membership is based on your performance on the 
visual perception task, and we would like to establish a link with your 
cognitive processing efficiency as measured by a computer task. I will take one 
of the groups and my assistant will take the other group to the computer 
facilities. " 
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Experimenter 1 lead one of the two groups to either the human subjects lab 
(303) o r  to  the computer lab (342) for the semantic priming task. 
Experimenter 2 lead the other group. The group taken, the computer room and 
the order of Experimenter 1 and 2 were counterbalanced for every group of 6 
subjects. The experimenters did not answer any questions referring to group 
membership, except by saying " it was based on your performance on the dot 
estimation task1'. Prior to the semantic priming task, half of the subjects 
completed a series of evaluative trait scales, the other half of the subjects 
completed the trait scales after completing the semantic priming task. 
Subjects were seated at a computer and read the following instructions: 
"The purpose of this portion of the study is to measure cognitive 
processing efficiency by examining the speed of categorization of people and 
objects. Your task will be to look at the computer screen on which the name of 
a group of people or objects like dog or tree d appear, and to read the name 
aloud, or to  yourself and think about what you feel a typical member of that 
group is like. After a brief time the screen will go blank; then a second word 
like shady, gnarled, friendly or faithful will appear, and you must decide as 
quickly and accurately as possible whether the second word can ever be true of 
that group, first word, or is always false. You will indicate your decision by 
pressing a computer key. Press M or Z for yes an M or Z for no (order 
counterbalanced across subjects). After you see the second word hit one of the 
keys sharply and release. You should respond as fast and accurately as 
possible: we are recording both speed and the key you hit. We will begin with a 
set of practice trials using the categories tree and dog (experimenter observes 
subjects complete the practice trials and ensures subjects understand the 
task). 
Now you will be presented with the names of two groups of people, LAJ 
and YOF, one of which you are a member of, as determined in the previous dot 
estimation task. Again respond as quickly and accurately as possible whether 
the second word such as kind, bad, or trustworthy can ever be true or is always 
false of the groups of people classdied as YOF or LAJ on the basis of the 
visual perception task. Subjects in the pre-computer task trait scale condition 
were instructed as follows prior to the semantic priming instructions: 
"Before we begin, we would like you to respond to a few questions. 
Using the scales I have handed to you, indicate the extent to which a 
member of the LAJ or YOF group ranks on these characteristics. When 
you are finished I vvlll collect the packets and get you started in the 
computer task" 
Subjects in the post-computer task trait scale condition were 
instructed as follows: 
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"Before were finished today, we would like you to respond to a few 
questions.Using the scales I have handed to you, indicate the extent to 
which a member of the LAJ or YOF group ranks on these 
characteristics.When you are finished I will collect the packets and we 
will go back into the room were you made your original dot estimations 
for debriefing and your extra credit." 
Prior to the semantic priming task, all subjects will be given another 




The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of minimal group 
identity on your reaction times to the positive and negative character traits 
that you saw in the semantic priming task. You were placed into either the 
YOF or  LAJ group based on random assignment, rather than on your dot 
estimation performance, as  you were informed. The reason for the deception 
was to demonstrate that even in conditions of random and arbitrary group 
assignment, positive bias towards members of ones own group is evident. We 
are predicting that your reaction times wiU be faster when your group label 
(either YOF or LAJ) is followed by a positive character trait. 
The evaluative trait scales that you filled out are predicted to illustrate 
a positive bias towards members of your own group, which has been 
demonstrated previously in a number of studies. This study is going one step 
further by predicting that not only will ingroup bias be demonstrated on the 
evaluative trait scales, but the group identscations will affect the cognitive 
processing of positive and negative information. 
We are sorry to  have used deception, but felt it was minimal and 
necessary to the success of the experiment. Any information obtained from 
you wiU be used solely for scientific purposes. Again, if the experimenters are 
unable to answer any questions that you may have, please feel free to contact 
Dr. Judi Allen at 271-286 1. We greatly appreciate your participation and you 




The purpose of this research is to investigate properties of visual 
judgment. In order to do this study you will be asked to  estimate the number 
of dots appearing on the screen in front of you and to record that estimation on 
the score sheets that will be provided to you. 
You are in no way obligated to participate in this study. Should you 
decide to withdraw from this study you may do so a t  any time without 
penalty. At the end of this study please feel free to ask any questions you may 
have. If the experimenters are unable to answer your questions completely, 
feel free to contact Dr. Judi Allen at 271-2861. 
By signing this form, you voluntarily agree to participate in this project. 
You can withdraw from this project a t  any time. You can decline to participate 
in  any part of it or decline to answer any questions without prejudice. Any 
information obtained will be used solely for scientific purposes. You may keep 
a copy of this consent form if you would like one. 
Name (please print) 
Name (signature) 
Date 
Sex (circleone) M F 
ID number 
APPENDIX D 
Evaluative Trait Scales 
Indicate on this scale the extent to which a typical member of the 'YOF" 
group ranks on this characteristic. 
I I I I I I I I I 
Competitive Cooperative 
Indicate on this scale the extent to which a typical member of the "LAJ" 
group ranks on this characteristic. 
I I I I I I I I I 
Competitive Cooperative 
APP IX E 
Example of Dot Estimation Task 

